Toyota RAV4 Investigations
7 ODI actions on file.
- DPDP22005RECALLOpened 1/27/2023Pedestrian alert soundsELECTRICAL SYSTEM:PROPULSION SYSTEM
NHTSA received a petition on or about July 18, 2022, requesting that Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 141 be applied to all electric and hybrid vehicles operating in the United States. The petition can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI Number 11486072. FMVSS 141 establishes performance requirements for pedestrian alert sounds for motor vehicles. The standard applies to hybrid and electric vehicles that have a gross vehicle weight rating of 4,536 KG or less or are defined as low-speed vehicles. The standard became fully applicable to all such vehicles manufactured on or after March 1, 2021.On January 27, 2023, NHTSA opened Defect Petition (DP) 22-005 to evaluate the subject matter described in the petition. On June 24, 2023 and as supplemented on June 25, 2023, the petitioner notified NHTSA he was withdrawing his petition. The petitioner indicated that, based on his review of data, there is no justification for asserting potential benefits that could be derived from actions sought by my petition. Based on the petitioner's withdrawal, DP22-005 is closed. Closure of this DP does not represent a determination by NHTSA regarding the subject matter of the petition.
- PEPE21005RECALLOpened 2/25/2021Battery Hold Down Bracket Thermal EventsELECTRICAL SYSTEM:12V/24V/48V BATTERY
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to understand the contributing factors and frequency of vehicle fires originating from the battery region of the engine compartment in Model Year (MY) 2013-2018 Toyota RAV4 vehicles on 25 February 2021. At the time of opening, ODI attributed eleven allegations and additional EWR events to this PE. PE21005 focused on replacement batteries installed in the subject vehicles. No reported fire event identified in PE21005 involved the originally supplied 12V battery. The reported fires took place in vehicles known to contain aftermarket batteries or whose age exceeded the expected life of the original equipment battery. ODI identified battery dimensioning as it relates to the battery retention system (hold down bracket, radiator support bolt, J-hook, and battery tray) as the main factor set in the contact between the battery hold down bracket contacting the positive terminal of the 12V battery. The subject vehicles carried over the same battery tray and retention system from the prior generation (MY2006 – MY2012) of RAV4 vehicles. However, the subject vehicles were equipped with a dimensionally smaller battery (Group 35) than the prior generation (Group 24F). The smaller- length measurement in the Group 35 battery size in a battery tray originally designed to fit a Group 24F battery contributed to increased potential for battery movement which was exacerbated by the diversity in aftermarket battery configuration and irregularities intrinsic to battery replacement procedures. Battery movement coupled with the proximity of the B+ terminal on the battery and the grounded electrically conductive hold down bracket set the stage for a short to ground leading to an engine stall (if in operation) followed by a vehicle fire. This investigation was not able to classify the installation status, battery size, or cause of every allegation due to the fire event causing damage to the area, inaccessible vehicle, modification to the battery retention system after the event, and/or inconclusive photographic evidence. Toyota's investigation of the issue identified aftermarket battery catalogs that listed an improper battery replacement size (Group 26R) that would nevertheless fit into the subject vehicles whose battery retention system is incapable of reliably restraining a Group 26R battery. On 18 November 2021, Toyota initiated a consumer advisory campaign (21TG01) to the subject vehicle owners, notifying them of the correct size battery and offering a free inspection of the battery and retention hardware, a caution label to affix to the hold down bracket, and a discounted replacement 12V battery. This investigation with Toyota established three broad categories to characterize the battery retention system state of a given vehicle: "correct", "minor mis-installation", and "major mis-installation". - The "correct" terminology references the front bolt, bracket, and J-hook installed in a position not in contact with the positive battery terminal and the front bolt torqued to 17 Nm and the J-hook engaged with the tray hole and torqued to 4.9 Nm. - A "minor mis-installation" would describe the three retention components installed in the prescribed location, however not to the correct torque values. - The "major mis-installation" condition would constitute a retention component missing or disconnected from the system. Toyota's own testing used five exemplar batteries installed on a subject vehicle in each battery categorization resulted in: - Contact between the B+ terminal and hold down bracket in "major mis-installations" - Movement of the battery in "minor mis-installations" - No observable motion in "correct" installations. ODI conducted its own evaluation of the Toyota- specified replacement battery and 5 aftermarket Group 35 batteries. The six batteries tested conformed to the Group 35 Battery Council International (BCI) standard on overall dimensional tolerance and terminal location. That standard does not define the edge shape or material of battery casing. Physical interaction between the hold down bracket and the battery case and the friction between the casing material and the battery tray resulted in a large variability in movement forces required to incite movement when the battery was installed in the "correct" condition. Resulting in movement at an induced lateral load between 0.6 G and 1.91 G equivalent force across each battery. This force is higher than a typical vehicle could exert in a steady state turn and would only experience loads through brief shock or impulses. Multiple shock or impulse loads across time would contribute to a delay between the replacement battery installation and the fire event. Likelihood of a fire event increases as the installation method degraded from the "correct", to "minor mis-installation", and then to "major mis-installation". Protruding vent caps atop some of the batteries tested aided in restricting battery movement relative to the hold down. An absence of vent caps permitted additional movement. Following several discussions and vehicle inspections with ODI during this investigation, on 01 November 2023, Toyota filed a safety recall (NHTSA 23V-734) of 1,853,568 MY 2013 through MY 2018 Toyota RAV4 vehicles to reduce the risk of a vehicle fire with redesigned battery retention components. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
- EAEA12006RECALLOpened 6/14/2012Power Window Master Switch FireELECTRICAL SYSTEM
On October 10, 2012, Toyota initiated a safety recall of approximately 2.5 million U.S. vehicles involving the following models and model years:2007-2009 Camry and Camry Hybrid, 2009 Corolla and Corolla Matrix, 2008 Highlander and Highlander Hybrid, 2007-2009 RAV4, 2008-2009 Scion xB and xD, 2008-2009 Sequoia, 2007-2008 Tundra, 2007-2008 Yaris, and 2009 Pontiac Vibe.See NHTSA recall number 12V-491 for more details, including the affected vehicle manufacture dates for each vehicle model.Note that only early-production 2009 model year vehicles are included in the recall.Toyota and GM dealers will inspect the power window master switch (PWMS) assemblies and apply a specialized grease that inhibits heat build-up.The circuit board in the PWMS may be replaced with a new one if notchy or sticking feeling is observed during the inspection.The failure report summary above shows counts for the vehicles identified at the start of this Engineering Analysis, specifically the approximately 1.4 million vehicles that share an identical PWMS assembly design including, model year 2007-2009 Camry, Camry Hybrid, RAV4, and Yaris built from September 2006 through August 2008, as well as all 2008 Highlander Hybrid.Toyota subsequently identified approximately one million additional vehicles that have a slightly different PWMS design but contain the same defect condition.Note that the totals for complaints and fires shown above may include duplicative reports (between ODI and manufacturer reports).This Engineering Analysis is closed.See attached report for additional information.The ODI reports cited above can be viewed at www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/owners/SearchNHTSAID under the following identification numbers: 10323848, 10360414, 10392622, 10394453, 10411328, 10429983, 10436663, 10446699, 10447416, 10447417, 10447419, 10447444, 10447515, 10447845, 10447947, 10449270, 10450133, 10450568, 10450606, 10450641, 10451821, 10455540, 10455614, 10456353, 10456438, 10457854, 10457955, 10459730, 10460166, 10460691, 10461220, 10462140, 10462200, 10462247, 10462404, 10462705, 10462761, 10464451, 10464769, 10465421, 10466279, 10466667, 10468126, 10468265, 10475230, 10470313, 10470684, 10471551, 10471824, 10472336, 10472910, 10473753, 10473967, 10473969, 10476921, 10477469, 10478563 and 10478657.
- PEPE12013RECALLOpened 6/4/2012Rear Suspension Arm Assembly FailureSUSPENSION:REAR
In a letter dated August 1, 2012 Toyota Motor Engineering & Manufacturing North America, Inc. (Toyota) submitted a Defect Information Report (NHTSA Recall No. 12V-373) to the NHTSA identifying a safety defect regarding possible separation of the Rear Suspension Arm No. 1 Assembly (arm) at the threaded portion (shaft and turn buckle) of the component in MY 2006 through MY 2011 Toyota RAV4 vehicles built from October 2005 through September 2010 and in MY 2010 Lexus HS250h vehicles manufactured from July 2009 through August 2010.According to Toyota, if the adjustment nuts for the rear wheel alignment are improperly tightened when alignment is performed in service, backlash may develop at the threaded portion of the arm, followed by rust formation.The threads may then wear causing the arm to separate, which may result in a loss of vehicle control.In analysis of both Vehicle Owner Questionnaire (VOQ) data submitted to the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) and consumer complaint data submitted to Toyota, ODI identified 131 non-duplicative reports alleging failure of the subject rear suspension arm (Note:some of the complaints and related service records refer to the arm as a rear tie rod).Six of the complainants allege the failure resulted in some loss of vehicle control.For purposes of this analysis, loss of control events involve alleged complete or partial departure from the intended lane of travel.An additional four complaints reported difficulty maintaining control of the vehicle when the arm failed.Recalled vehicles will be inspected for proper torque of the adjustment nuts and replaced as necessary.In addition, Toyota will take several actions to reduce the potential for improper torque in future alignment procedures.This includes:(1) providing proper tightening sequence and torque specification information to two major wheel alignment equipment manufacturers, who would disseminate the information to alignment shops using their equipment; (2) installation of a clip on each arm with an instructional label showing proper tightening sequence and torque specification (the clip must be removed to perform a wheel alignment); (3) installation of additional labels on the front and back vertical surfaces of the Rear Suspension Arm No. 2 assemblies; and (4) providing an instruction booklet to owners to place in the glove box.This investigation is closed.
- OTHEREQ12002CLOSEDOpened 2/14/2012Autoliv Air Bag Propellant MixtureAIR BAGS:SIDE/WINDOW
The summary for this investigation, labeled EQ12-002 Autoliv Closing Resume, can be found attached separately to this resume.This EQ is closed.
- PEPE12002CLOSEDOpened 2/6/2012Power Window Master Switch FireELECTRICAL SYSTEM
ODI has identified certain Toyota vehicles experiencing a higher rate of fire and thermal event incidents among all Toyota vehicles that use the same power window master switch design.They include a total of approximately 1.4 million model year (MY) 2007 through 2009 Camry, Camry Hybrid, RAV4 and Yaris vehicles built from approximately September 2006 through August 2008, as well as all MY 2008 Highlander Hybrid vehicles.This Preliminary Evaluation has been upgraded to an Engineering Analysis (EA12-006) to further study the alleged defect and its consequences.The ODI reports cited above can be viewed at www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/owners/SearchNHTSAID under the following identification numbers: 10461220, 10460691, 10460166, 10459730, 10457955, 10457854, 10456438, 10456353, 10455614, 10455540, 10451821, 10450641, 10450606, 10450568, 10450133, 10449270, 10447947, 10447845, 10447515, 10447444, 10447419, 10447417, 10447416, 10446699, 10436663, 10429983, 10411328, 10407290, 10394453, 10392622, 10360414, 10323848.
- RQRQ10003RECALLOpened 2/16/2010Unintended and Uncontrolled AccelerationELECTRICAL SYSTEM:SOFTWARE
On February 16, 2010, NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened RQ10-003 to determine whether the scope of prior Toyota recalls relating to potential unintended acceleration were sufficiently broad, including, among others, Toyota recalls 07E-082, 09V-388, 10V-017, and 10V-023.NHTSA also requested information regarding potential electronic causes of unintended acceleration in Toyota and Lexus vehicles.I. Pedal Interference from Floor mats, Carpet Covers and Plastic Pads in Carpets.During the RQ10-003 investigation, ODI reviewed a large volume of documents to assess whether additional vehicles should be recalled.Following the agency's analysis, NHTSA requested that Toyota recall additional vehicles.Toyota complied with the agency's request.The details of these recalls are set forth more fully in Toyota's reports to NHTSA pursuant to 49 CFR Part 573.These recalls are as follows:Recall 11V-112: (1) model year (MY) 2004-2006 Toyota Highlander and Highlander Hybrid; and, (2) MY 2004-2007 Lexus RX330,RX350, and RX400h (hybrid model). The total estimated population under this recall is 769,379 vehicles.This recall remedies potential accelerator pedal entrapment caused by a loose floor carpet cover (trim panel). Recall 11V-113: (1) MY 2003-2009 through 2009 Toyota 4Runner; (2) MY 2006-2010 Toyota RAV4; and, (3) MY 2008-2011 Lexus LX570.The total estimated population under this recall is 1,381,000 vehicles.This recall supplements recall 09V-388 and remedies potential accelerator pedal entrapment by an unsecured floor mat.Recall 11V-115: (1) MY 2006-2007 Lexus GS300 (all wheel drive vehicles); and, (2) MY 2006-2007 Lexus GS350 (all wheel drive vehicles). The total estimated population under this recall is 19,647 vehicles.This recall remedies potential accelerator pedal entrapment caused by inadequate clearance between the pedal linkage and a plastic pad embedded in the vehicle's carpet.II. Potential Electronic Causes of Unintended Acceleration.After NHTSA opened RQ10-003, NHTSA launched a ten-month study of potential electronic causes of unintended acceleration in Toyota vehicles.NHTSA launched the study in the spring of 2010 in light of concerns aired in Congressional hearings.NHTSA enlisted engineers at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) with expertise in areas such as computer controlled electronic systems, electromagnetic interference and software integrity to assess whether electronic systems or electromagnetic interference played a role in incidents of unintended acceleration in Toyota vehicles.That study has concluded.Two reports are associated with the study and are available on NHTSA's website.NASA's report is entitled Technical Support to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) on the Reported Toyota Motor Corporation (TMC) Unintended Acceleration (UA) Investigation, NESC Assessment No. TI-10-00618 (Jan. 18, 2011).NHTSA's report is entitled Technical Assessment of Toyota Electronic Throttle Control (ETC) Systems (Feb. 2011).Both reports should be read in conjunction with each other. As stated in its report, NASA did not find an electronic cause of large throttle openings that can result in unintended acceleration incidents. NHTSA did not find a vehicle-based cause of unintended acceleration incidents other than the physical pedal interference causes that are being addressed by Toyota's recalls. This RQ is closed.