Honda CR-V Investigations (2005)
6 ODI actions on file.
- EAEA21002OPENOpened 9/17/2021Desiccated Air Bag Inflator RuptureAIR BAGS:FRONTAL:DRIVER SIDE:INFLATOR MODULE
From 2000 through 2017, Takata produced millions of air bag inflators using two types of phase-stabilized ammonium nitrate ("PSAN") propellant -- propellant 2004 and propellant 2004L. After prolonged exposure to high temperature cycles and humidity, inflators using propellant 2004 can degrade, causing the propellant to burn too quickly when ignited. The rapid burning can cause the inflator to rupture during deployment, potentially causing serious or even fatal injury to vehicle occupants. See 2016 Blomquist Report at www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/documents/expert_report-hrblomquist.pdf.Consequently, all frontal inflators using propellant 2004 that do not contain a "desiccant" (a substance that traps and holds moisture) in US vehicles are under recall. These "non-desiccated" inflators either have been or are required to be replaced.In some cases, the remedy part for these recalled inflators was, or will be, an inflator using either propellant 2004 or 2004L that does contain a desiccant. None of these "desiccated" remedy parts (which were installed in older model year vehicles) are currently under recall for a degradation concern. Certain subsets of desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004 for use as original equipment, however, have been recalled for a degradation concern. All Takata inflators produced with propellant 2004L contain desiccant, and none of these desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L are under recall for a degradation concern. There have been no reported field ruptures in any non-recalled desiccated PSAN inflators.It is understood that desiccants fully saturate at some threshold, at which point any additional moisture will not be captured. This means the degradation process observed in non-desiccated inflators using propellant 2004 may also occur in non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004, assuming additional moisture enters the inflator and high temperature cycling occurs. Based on available information, desiccant saturation can occur within the first five years in the worst environments, and the time required for full saturation is affected by multiple factors. While no present safety risk has been identified, further work is needed to evaluate the future risk of non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004.Three entities -- Takata (now known as TK Global), the Independent Testing Coalition, and Exponent -- have been studying the long-term behavior of Takata desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004L (as well as 2004) in the presence of moisture and temperature cycling. The research efforts, which include development of predictive modeling techniques and field sample analysis, are ongoing. To date, none of the researchers have identified field evidence showing that propellant 2004L is undergoing a degradation process that leads to aggressive deployment and potential rupture. However, the time in service of such inflators remains short compared to that of the inflators using propellant 2004. Further study is needed to assess the long-term safety of desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L.The Office of Defects Investigation is opening this investigation to examine whether a safety defect related to propellant degradation exists in non-recalled desiccated PSAN frontal inflators manufactured by Takata. This investigation will require extensive information on Takata production processes and surveys of inflators in the field. Lists of recall actions that may have used desiccated PSAN inflators as remedy parts, as well as the makes and models originally manufactured with them, is available with the downloadable version of this document (see nhtsa.gov/recalls?nhtsaId=EA21002 -- note this information is subject to change/revision as the investigation proceeds). This investigation does not supersede EA15-001, which remains open.
- EAEA15001RECALLOpened 2/24/2015Air Bag Inflator RuptureAIR BAGS:FRONTAL
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened PE14-016 in June 2014 based on six inflator rupture incidents involving consumer owned vehicles produced by five vehicle manufacturers.All six vehicles were operated in Florida or Puerto Rico at the time of the rupture and for the majority of their service life, and were equipped with inflators produced by Takata, a tier-one supplier of automotive air bag systems.During the course of PE14-016, ODI determined that five additional vehicle manufacturers used inflators of a similar design and vintage also supplied by Takata. No evidence of field failures was found in vehicles produced by these five additional manufacturers.Nonetheless, at ODI's insistence, all 10 vehicle manufacturers initiated a regional recall within approximately two weeks of the opening of the investigation.The regions recalled initially included Florida, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, areas with high absolute humidity and climatic conditions believed to be a significant factor in the inflator ruptures.As part of the recall actions, inflators removed from remedied vehicles are to be returned to Takata for testing.Takata's initial test results on passenger inflators from remedied vehicles indicated a much higher than anticipated rupture frequency for inflators returned from Florida.Accordingly ODI requested all 10 manufacturers expand the regional recalls for passenger inflators to include other geographic areas where high absolute humidity conditions exist, including the Gulf States and other coastal areas.Takata's testing of the passenger inflators to date continues to indicate this geographic area as having the highest risk, with no ruptures occurring from inflators returned from outside the expanded recall regions.During PE14-016 four additional passenger inflator field events occurred, all in vehicles from the same expanded geographic region.Also during PE14-016 four additional driver inflator field events occurred including two in vehicles from regions not known for high absolute humidity, specifically California and North Carolina.Accordingly, ODI requested all five of the affected vehicle manufacturers currently using the subject Takata driver inflators expand to nationwide recalls.Significantly, neither of the affected vehicle manufacturers or Takata provided any explanation to account for these two driver air bag inflator ruptures outside the area of high absolute humidity.Takata testing of returned driver inflators indicates a lower rupture frequency as compared to passenger inflator testing.All test ruptures reported by Takata to date have occurred on inflators returned from high absolute humidity areas.The investigation now includes all manufacturers and vehicles known to be affected at this time.ODI's investigation will focus on, among other things, root cause analysis, other potential defect consequences, identification of affected vehicles scope, and adequacy of the remedy.The five ODI reports cited above can be reviewed online at http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/owners/SearchNHTSAID under the following identification numbers: 10537899, 10568848, 10585224, 10605877, 10651492
- PEPE14016RECALLOpened 6/11/2014Air Bag Inflator RuptureAIR BAGS:FRONTAL
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened PE14-016 in June 2014 based on six inflator rupture incidents involving consumer owned vehicles produced by five vehicle manufacturers.All six vehicles were operated in Florida or Puerto Rico at the time of the rupture and for the majority of their service life, and were equipped with inflators produced by Takata, a tier-one supplier of automotive air bag systems.During the course of PE14-016, ODI determined that five additional vehicle manufacturers used inflators of a similar design and vintage also supplied by Takata. No evidence of field failures was found in vehicles produced by these five additional manufacturers.Nonetheless, at ODI's insistence, all 10 vehicle manufacturers initiated a regional recall within approximately two weeks of the opening of the investigation.The regions recalled initially included Florida, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, areas with consistently high absolute humidity and climatic conditions believed to be a significant factor in the inflator ruptures.As part of the recall actions, inflators removed from remedied vehicles are to be returned to Takata for testing.Takata's initial test results on passenger inflators from remedied vehicles indicated a much higher than anticipated rupture frequency for inflators returned from Florida.Accordingly, ODI requested all 10 manufacturers expand the regional recalls for passenger inflators to include other geographic areas where high absolute humidity conditions exist, including the Gulf States and other coastal areas.Takata's testing of the passenger inflators to date continues to indicate this geographic area as having the highest risk, with no ruptures occurring from inflators returned from outside the expanded recall regions.During PE14-016, four additional passenger inflator field events occurred, all in vehicles from the same expanded geographic region.Also during PE14-016, four additional driver inflator field events occurred including two in vehicles from regions not known for high absolute humidity, specifically California and North Carolina.Accordingly, ODI requested all five of the affected vehicle manufacturers currently using the subject Takata driver inflators expand to nationwide recalls.Significantly, neither of the affected vehicle manufacturers or Takata provided any explanation to account for these two driver air bag inflator ruptures outside the area of high absolute humidity.Takata testing of returned driver inflators indicates a lower rupture frequency as compared to passenger inflator testing.All test ruptures reported by Takata to date have occurred on inflators returned from high absolute humidity areas.The PE is now closed/upgraded to an Engineering Evaluation (EA15-001) to include all manufacturersand vehicles known to be affected at this time.ODI's EA investigation will focus on, among other things, root cause analysis, other potential defect consequences, identification of affected vehicles scope, and adequacy of the remedy.The recalls related to this PE are: 14V343, 14V344, 14V348, 14V351, 14V353, 14V655, 14V700, 14V701, 14V752, 14V763, 14V770, 14V773, 14V787, 14V802 and 14V817.The number of vehicles affected are an estimate since some vehicles may have both the driver and passenger side inflators recalled. The five ODI reports cited above can be reviewed online at http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/owners/SearchNHTSAID under the following identification numbers: 10537899, 10568848, 10585224, 10605877, 10651492
- EAEA11004RECALLOpened 4/11/2011Driver's Power Window Master SwitchELECTRICAL SYSTEM
This investigation was prompted by Preliminary Evaluation (PE) 10-047 and was based on reports from consumers alleging that smoke and/or fire, as defined in 49 CFR ? 579.4, had occurred inside of the driver's door.The subject vehicles, model year (MY) 2006 CR-V, were manufactured at two different assembly plants.The vehicles manufactured in Japan (Sayama plant) were produced with a power window master switch (PWMS) supplied by the Thai Toyo Denso Company, Ltd. (Denso).The vehicles manufactured in the United Kingdom (UK, Swindon, England plant) were produced with a PWMS supplied by the Omron Corporation (Omron).Honda provided 45 reports on the subject vehicles responsive to this investigation.Of this number, 24 reports concerned Japan-built vehicles, 19 reports on UK-built vehicles, and two reports without a vehicle identification number which could not be identified by assembly plant. Four of Honda's reports were duplicative of ODI reports.ODI received nine reports on the subject vehicles:five on Japan-built and four on UK-built vehicles, and one additional report on a MY 2005 UK built vehicle.The ODI reports can be reviewed at http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/owners/SearchNHTSAID under the following identification (ODI) numbers: 10343884, 10307287, 10321646, 10375324, 10386750, 10425406, 10437807, 10439880, 10469350, and 10406979.In most cases, it was reported that the PWMS and/or its electrical wiring harness had sustained heat related damage requiring replacement of the affected component(s).However, in three of the cases involving an Omron PWMS (UK built), a fire breached the driver's door panel and spread into the vehicle interior.Two of the three vehicles were determined to be a total loss by insurance companies, and one was repaired.All three fires occurred as the vehicles were parked with the ignition switch turned off.On September 6, 2011 Honda submitted a Defect Information Report (DIR) to recall 80,111 subject vehicles built in Japan.In it's DIR, Honda explained that the Denso PWMS assembly has switches made of a resin material that can allow residues to accumulate over time.Residue from silicone based cleaning products used near the PWMS can adhere to the electrical contacts of the switch and repeated operation of the switch may accelerate wear of the electrical contact.Silicone particles that have accumulated between the power source and the ground in the switch can become heated when electrical power is supplied to the circuit.If this occurs, the resin material of the switch can carbonize and form an electrically conductive path which causes the resin material to heat up.As a result, the switch may melt and produce smoke.In the worst case, the switch cover may burn.ODI notes that this recall was limited to MY 2006 because the PWMS subject to the recall (P/N 3750-S9A-C05ZA) was made of a new resin material introduced during MY 2006 production.ODI continued its investigation with respect to UK built vehicles with the Omron PMWS.On October 4, 2012 Honda submitted an additional DIR to recall 268,655 MY 2002-2006 CR-V vehicles.Honda's DIR stated that water or other fluids can enter the Omron PWMS assembly and over time cause electrical resistance in the switch.Increased resistance can result in overheating and melting of the switch, which could potentially cause a fire.Please see both DIRs at http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/recalls/ under safety recalls 11V456 and 12V486 for further details of the recalls.
- PEPE10047RECALLOpened 11/22/2010Driver's Master Power Window SwitchELECTRICAL SYSTEM
This investigation was opened based on three Vehicle Owner's Questionnaire reports alleging smoke and fire occurred inside of the driver's door.The complainants reported that the master power window switch and, in some cases its wiring harness, had sustained heat related damage and required replacement.Since opening the investigation the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received two additional reports.The reports provided by Honda in response to ODI's Information Request appear consistent with ODI's Vehicle Owner's Questionnaire reports. Based on the information provided by Honda in response to this preliminary evaluation and its ongoing analysis, the investigation will be upgraded to engineering analysis EA11-004 to further study the issue.
- EAEA04027CLOSEDOpened 9/9/2004UNDERHOOD FIRESENGINE AND ENGINE COOLING
IN DOCUMENTS PROVIDED DURING EA04-027, HONDA IDENTIFIED A MECHANISM WHICH CAUSES THE RUBBER SEAL (GASKET) OF THE ORIGINAL EQUIPMENT (OE) OIL FILTER TO ADHERE TO THE ENGINE BLOCK OF THE SUBJECT VEHICLES.IF AN ADHERED SEAL REMAINS WHEN THE OE FILTER IS REMOVED AND A NEW FILTER IS INSTALLED, A DOUBLE GASKET CONDITION RESULTS.A SUBSEQUENT RUPTURE OF THE EXTRANEOUS SEAL CAN RESULT IN OIL CONTACTING NEARBY EXHAUST SYSTEM SURFACES AND A FIRE MAY OCCUR.THROUGHOUT ITS DISCUSSIONS WITH ODI, HONDA HAS MAINTAINED THAT IT IS THE SERVICING TECHNICIAN?S RESPONSIBILITY TO INSPECT FOR AND REMOVE THE SEAL PRIOR TO INSTALLING A NEW FILTER.ODI?S ANALYSIS FOUND THAT SEAL ADHESION, IN CONJUNCTION WITH TECHNICIAN ERROR AND EXHAUST COMPONENT LOCATION, RESULTED IN A HIGH RATE OF SUBJECT VEHICLE OIL FILTER FIRES COMPARED TO EARLIER MODELS AND PEERS.VEHICLES THAT HAVE NOT HAD THE OE FILTER DISTURBED ARE NOT AT RISK.SERVICE REPLACEMENT FILTER SEALS, WHICH ARE MANUFACTURED BY A DIFFERENT SUPPLIER, DO NOT EXHIBIT THE SEAL ADHESION CONDITION.THEREFORE, IF THE INITIAL OIL CHANGE IS DONE PROPERLY, THE ELEVATED FIRE RISK IS ELIMINATED FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE VEHICLE?S LIFE.BASED ON AVERAGE MILEAGE ACCUMULATION AND OIL SERVICE INTERVAL, ODI ESTIMATES THAT MORE THAN TWO THIRDS OF THE SUBJECT VEHICLES HAVE RECEIVED THEIR INITIAL OIL CHANGE AND ARE NO LONGER AT AN ELEVATED RISK.HONDA CHANGED THE DESIGN OF THE FILTER SEAL TO PREVENT THE ADHESION CONDITION AND INTRODUCED THE NEW SEAL AT BOTH CR-V ASSEMBLY PLANTS IN DECEMBER 2004.IN A DECEMBER 8, 2004 LETTER TO ODI, HONDA COMMITTED TO SEND A NOTIFICATION TO SUBJECT VEHICLE OWNERS ADVISING OF THE FIRE RISK IF AN OIL CHANGE IS IMPROPERLY PERFORMED.THE LETTER DISCUSSES MEASURES CONSUMERS CAN TAKE TO ENSURE THE FIRST OIL CHANGE IS DONE PROPERLY.LETTER MAILINGS COMMENCED ON DECEMBER 10, 2004.OWNERS WHO HAVE RECENTLY HAD THEIR FIRST OIL CHANGE PERFORMED AND ARE UNSURE IF IT WAS DONE CORRECTLY CAN HAVE IT INSPECTED BY A HONDA DEALER AT NO CHARGE; IF AN IMPROPER FILTER INSTALLATION IS DETECTED, A FREE REMEDY WILL BE PROVIDED BY THE DEALER.UNSOLD SUBJECT VEHICLES IN DEALER STOCK (~20,000 UNITS) WILL HAVE THE OE FILTER REPLACED WITH A SERVICE COMPONENT PRIOR TO RETAIL.THE INJURY NOTED ABOVE OCCURRED WHEN A CONSUMER SLIPPED ON OIL THAT LEAKED FROM THEIR VEHICLE.RECENT REPORT TRENDS INDICATE THAT HONDA?S EFFORTS TO IMPROVE OIL FILTER SERVICE PROFICIENCY AT THEIR DEALERSHIPS HAVE BEEN EFFECTIVE.SEE THE EA04-027 SUMMARY REPORT FOR FURTHER DETAILS ON THIS INVESTIGATION.