Honda CR-V Investigations
7 ODI actions on file.
- EAEA24002OPENOpened 4/15/2024Inadvertent Automatic Emergency BrakingFORWARD COLLISION AVOIDANCE: AUTOMATIC EMERGENCY BRAKING
On February 21, 2022, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation (PE22003) to assess reports of inadvertent activation of the Collision Mitigation Braking System (CMBS), an automatic emergency braking (AEB) system, in model year 2017-2019 Honda CR-V and 2018-2019 Honda Accord vehicles. The reports allege that activation of the AEB system occurs while driving with no apparent obstruction in the vehicle's forward path, resulting in sudden vehicle deceleration. Honda indicated that they were aware of a total of X,XXX reports that may relate to the alleged defect. Honda provided analysis of the alleged defect and alleges that some customers possibly had an inadequate understanding of the CMBS and its limitations. However, many consumer complaints allege that Honda dealerships were unable to reproduce the condition or state that they were informed that this is considered normal CMBS operation. To date, ODI has received a total of 1,294 consumer complaints of inadvertent activation of CMBS in 2017-2022 Honda CR-V and 2018-2022 Honda Accord vehicles. A total of 31 complaints alleged a crash and 50 alleged an injury. The Total column in the Failure Report Summary removes duplicate reports and shows the total number of reports with unique VINs from all Manufacturer, ODI, and EWR data sources. In some cases, there were multiple reports associated with a particular vehicle in which recurring failures were alleged. In total, there were X,XXX reports, 93 injury incidents and 47 crashes involving vehicles with unique VINs that may relate to the alleged defect. PE22-003 has been upgraded to an Engineering Analysis to further assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety related consequences of the inadvertent AEB activations. The scope has been expanded to include assessment of model year 2020-2022 Honda CR-V and Accord vehicles. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
- EAEA23003RECALLOpened 11/29/2023Momentary Increased Steering EffortSTEERING
On November 29, 2023, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened this Engineering Analysis (EA23003) to assess allegations of momentary increase in steering effort in model years (MY) 2022-2023 Honda Civic, 2023MY Honda CR-V, and 2023MY Acura Integra vehicles (subject vehicles). The complaints received by ODI alleged that the subject vehicles experienced a momentary increase in required steering effort (described as “sticky steering”) occurring mostly at highway speeds after driving for an extended amount of time; these complaints could not be duplicated during dealer service technicians’ quick test drives. The complaints had been received over the previous two years with most occurring with low vehicle mileage. The steering gear of these vehicles is aided by an electrical power assist unit. This power assist unit inputs force on the steering rack via a worm gear and worm wheel assembly. During PE23005, Honda stated this condition of momentary increase in steering effort occurs due to two factors within this power assist unit. First, during manufacturing, the steering worm wheel goes through annealing and component conditioning processes. These processes cause internal stress and strain within the steering worm wheel. This strain is slowly released over the first few months of the vehicle life. Over time, the released strain causes deformation of the teeth on the worm wheel, causing the worm gear to catch on the worm wheel. This catching results in the driver’s momentary increased steering effort. Second, the manufacturing process did not guarantee consistent grease application and, therefore, some subject vehicles received insufficient grease which contributed to the momentary increase in steering effort. During EA23003, ODI further analyzed the potential safety related consequences of the momentary increase in steering effort. NHTSA’s Vehicle Research and Test Center (VRTC) duplicated the allegations of increased steering effort. In addition, VRTC discovered the steering worm wheel and worm gear tended to push grease out of the meshing area, resulting in large amounts of grease resting on top of the worm wheel. Information Request responses collected and reviewed by ODI showed Honda had also discovered this additional root cause during NHTSA’s EA. In addition, Honda discovered the preload of the worm wheel gear spring was set too high, increasing the gear slide load and resulting in higher friction and increased torque fluctuation when steering. The number of consumer complaints made to ODI continued to increase with the expansion of scope from the PE to the EA. Additionally, during EA23003, ODI received ten complaints alleging a crash, in addition to the 13 complaints ODI had received as of the time it opened EA23003. In total, 23 crashes have been reported to ODI due to this alleged defect. On October 3, 2024, Honda filed NHTSA Recall No. 24V-744 to address this defect. The recall will provide consumers with a new steering worm wheel gear spring with a decreased load. Additionally, dealerships will add additional grease and relocate any grease sitting on top of the worm wheel back into the meshing area. The scope of this recall includes all Honda vehicles that were manufactured with this specific improperly produced steering worm wheel and spring. In view of the recall action being taken by Honda, ODI is closing EA23003. NHTSA reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
- PEPE22011CLOSEDOpened 11/28/2022Rear Differential SeizurePOWER TRAIN:AXLE ASSEMBLY:AXLE SHAFT
On November 29, 2022, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened PE 22-011 after reviewing field reports alleging rear differential seizure in 2018-2022MY Honda CR-V and HR-V vehicles equipped with all wheel drive. To date, ODI has not received any consumer complaints. Some of the field reports received alleged the vehicle’s wheels locked up with no warning while the vehicle was in motion. These vehicles were towed to a dealership. Examination of these vehicles showed the driveshaft had broken and the differential unit was completely damaged. The field reports cited a lack of oil due to damaged oil seals as the cause. Honda provided data including consumer complaints, field reports, and warranty claims they received relating to the loss of oil retention and resulting differential damage. Honda’s data cited 1201 incidents with unique vehicle identification numbers (VINs). The rear differential oil seals prevent the oil from leaking out and protect internal components from contaminants. A loss of oil lubrication results in failure of the vehicle differential. Honda stated that the oil seal’s lip contact with the driveshaft may become unstable due to intermittent changes in internal pressure. Their review of field report and warranty data indicated that these failures occurred early in the vehicle’s life thus the failures were covered by the manufacturer’s warranty. Honda stated that in November 2021 they changed the seal specifications and improved the packaging process of the parts for transport. Honda also enacted an enhanced visual inspection process both before and after the oil seal installation on the assembly line. Honda stated that in the event of differential failure, the operator can control the vehicle without stability loss. After the drive shafts break due to differential failure, the operator will hear noises and the vehicle will still function as a 2WD vehicle preventing complete loss of motive power. Based on the following factors, ODI is closing this investigation: · Information regarding field failures does not indicate hazardous outcomes · The failures are occurring early in the life of the vehicle · Repairs are covered under the manufacturer’s warranty · The vehicle can continue functioning as a 2WD without loss of stability control in the event of failure The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exist, and the agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by new circumstances.
- PEPE22003CLOSEDOpened 2/21/2022Inadvertent Automatic Emergency BrakingFORWARD COLLISION AVOIDANCE: AUTOMATIC EMERGENCY BRAKING
On February 21, 2022, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation (PE22003) to assess reports of inadvertent activation of the Collision Mitigation Braking System (CMBS), an automatic emergency braking (AEB) system, in model year 2017-2019 Honda CR-V and 2018-2019 Honda Accord vehicles. The reports allege that activation of the AEB system occurs while driving with no apparent obstruction in the vehicle's forward path, resulting in sudden vehicle deceleration. Honda indicated that they were aware of a total of X,XXX reports that may relate to the alleged defect. Honda provided analysis of the alleged defect and alleges that some customers possibly had an inadequate understanding of the CMBS and its limitations. However, many consumer complaints allege that Honda dealerships were unable to reproduce the condition or state that they were informed that this is considered normal CMBS operation. To date, ODI has received a total of 1,081 consumer complaints of inadvertent activation of CMBS in the subject vehicles. A total of 24 complaints alleged a crash and 42 alleged an injury. The Total column in the Failure Report Summary removes duplicate reports and shows the total number of reports with unique VINs from all Manufacturer, ODI, and EWR data sources. In some cases, there were multiple reports associated with a particular vehicle in which recurring failures were alleged. In total, there were X,XXX reports, 84 injury incidents and 40 crashes involving vehicles with unique VINs that may relate to the alleged defect. PE22003 has been upgraded to an Engineering Analysis (EA24002) to further assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety related consequences of the inadvertent AEB activations. Further the scope has been expanded to include assessment of model year 2020-2022 Honda CR-V and Accord vehicles. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
- EAEA21002OPENOpened 9/17/2021Desiccated Air Bag Inflator RuptureAIR BAGS:FRONTAL:DRIVER SIDE:INFLATOR MODULE
From 2000 through 2017, Takata produced millions of air bag inflators using two types of phase-stabilized ammonium nitrate ("PSAN") propellant -- propellant 2004 and propellant 2004L. After prolonged exposure to high temperature cycles and humidity, inflators using propellant 2004 can degrade, causing the propellant to burn too quickly when ignited. The rapid burning can cause the inflator to rupture during deployment, potentially causing serious or even fatal injury to vehicle occupants. See 2016 Blomquist Report at www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/documents/expert_report-hrblomquist.pdf.Consequently, all frontal inflators using propellant 2004 that do not contain a "desiccant" (a substance that traps and holds moisture) in US vehicles are under recall. These "non-desiccated" inflators either have been or are required to be replaced.In some cases, the remedy part for these recalled inflators was, or will be, an inflator using either propellant 2004 or 2004L that does contain a desiccant. None of these "desiccated" remedy parts (which were installed in older model year vehicles) are currently under recall for a degradation concern. Certain subsets of desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004 for use as original equipment, however, have been recalled for a degradation concern. All Takata inflators produced with propellant 2004L contain desiccant, and none of these desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L are under recall for a degradation concern. There have been no reported field ruptures in any non-recalled desiccated PSAN inflators.It is understood that desiccants fully saturate at some threshold, at which point any additional moisture will not be captured. This means the degradation process observed in non-desiccated inflators using propellant 2004 may also occur in non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004, assuming additional moisture enters the inflator and high temperature cycling occurs. Based on available information, desiccant saturation can occur within the first five years in the worst environments, and the time required for full saturation is affected by multiple factors. While no present safety risk has been identified, further work is needed to evaluate the future risk of non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004.Three entities -- Takata (now known as TK Global), the Independent Testing Coalition, and Exponent -- have been studying the long-term behavior of Takata desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004L (as well as 2004) in the presence of moisture and temperature cycling. The research efforts, which include development of predictive modeling techniques and field sample analysis, are ongoing. To date, none of the researchers have identified field evidence showing that propellant 2004L is undergoing a degradation process that leads to aggressive deployment and potential rupture. However, the time in service of such inflators remains short compared to that of the inflators using propellant 2004. Further study is needed to assess the long-term safety of desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L.The Office of Defects Investigation is opening this investigation to examine whether a safety defect related to propellant degradation exists in non-recalled desiccated PSAN frontal inflators manufactured by Takata. This investigation will require extensive information on Takata production processes and surveys of inflators in the field. Lists of recall actions that may have used desiccated PSAN inflators as remedy parts, as well as the makes and models originally manufactured with them, is available with the downloadable version of this document (see nhtsa.gov/recalls?nhtsaId=EA21002 -- note this information is subject to change/revision as the investigation proceeds). This investigation does not supersede EA15-001, which remains open.
- EAEA19001RECALLOpened 4/19/2019Electrical overstressAIR BAGS: AIR BAG/RESTRAINT CONTROL MODULE
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened this investigation to determine if the failure of airbags to deploy during severe crashes, in certain vehicles, was the result of a safety related defect. During the investigation a complex failure was studied that can result in non-deployment of subject vehicle air bags and other restraint system devices in severe crash events. The subject vehicles may be equipped with an airbag control unit (ACU) for the supplemental restraint system (SRS) Electronic Control Unit (ECU) manufactured by ZF-TRW. The ECU receives signals from crash sensors mounted in the vehicle and deploys the vehicle air bags and seat belt pretensioners in accordance with manufacturer design specifications. The ECU in the subject vehicles contains a model DS84 application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) which controls the communication of the crash sensor signal, firing commands (i.e., when to deploy the airbag(s) and/or pretensioners), and fault information (e.g., diagnostic trouble codes). In September 2016, FCA announced recall 16V-668 for certain model year (MY) 2010 to 2014 Chrysler, Dodge and Jeep products manufactured with the subject ZF-TRW ACU. In this recall, FCA discussed an EOS condition that resulted in a failure of the subject DS84 ASIC, which caused air bag non-deployment. FCA noted that the defect condition had only been observed in vehicles equipped with sensor harnessing routed across the front of the vehicle. Other FCA vehicles that also used the subject ACU, but were not equipped with cross-car harnessing, had not experienced EOS failures, despite similar time in service. During the course of this investigation, ODI sent two separate Information Request (IR) letters to six vehicle manufactures (including FCA, Hyundai, Honda, Kia, Mitsubishi, and Toyota) and one IR letter to ZF-TRW. These IR letters resulted in ODI receiving comprehensive data from these manufacturers and suppliers. Studies of this data found that the DS84 ASIC does not have sufficient protection against negative electrical transients or electrical overstress (“EOS”) that can be generated in certain severe crashes. An electrical transient occurs when the electrical power supplied to a circuit changes momentarily over a short duration of time. In these severe crash cases, the crash sensors and other powered wiring can be damaged and short circuited so as to create a negative electrical transient of sufficient intensity and duration (that are outside the vehicle manufacturer's specification) to damage the ASIC before the restraint device deployment signal is received by the SRS ECU. This damaged signal can lead to incomplete or nondeployment of the air bags and/or pretensioners. Airbag non-deployment and/or lack of pretensioner operation can increase the risk or severity of injury in a crash.A total of 8 fatalities and 14 injuries were associated with known EOS events. The common element in all investigated manufacturers vehicles is the SRS ECU containing a DS84 ASIC manufactured by ZF-TRW. The risk associated with the ASIC is equally shared among all OEMS involved in the investigation. The actual real-world risk can be mitigated by other factors which were assessed by ODI during this investigation. The first mitigating factor involves protections built into the ACU design which protect the DS84 ASIC from damage. There are multiple strategies and levels of protection employed by different OEMs that provide effective EOS mitigation. The two most common strategies at the ACU level are circuit protection diodes on the remote senor signal lines, and current limiting resistors that protect critical components. The second mitigating factor is found at the vehicle level and involves the location and routing of the wires leading from the crash sensors to the SRS ECU. If the wires are well protected in a crash and are not routed with other power wires carrying large currents, the risk for an EOS event is significantly reduced or eliminated. These design specific factors combine to produce a spectrum of risk for the vehicles equipped with ACUs using the DS84 ASIC. Given the many of years of field exposure, it is possible to divide the subject population into two groups; vehicles which have experienced EOS events, and vehicles which have not experienced EOS field events. Four of the six OEMs involved in this investigation have experienced EOS field events on at least one of their models equipped with a DS84 ASIC. All vehicle models (including the Toyota models identified in the Failure Report Summary of the opening resume for this investigation) with field events have been recalled. In an abundance of caution, ODI kept this investigation open five years to monitor field performance and did not identify any field events on vehicles not included in existing safety recalls. Given the spectrum of risk identified in this investigation and that all vehicles with a demonstrated unreasonable risk have been recalled, ODI is closing this investigation. ODI is closing this investigation with the following manufacturer safety recalls: 16V-668, 18E-043, 18V-137, 18V-363, and 20V-024. With the recall actions taken by the subject vehicle and equipment manufacturers, this investigation is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exists on other model or model year vehicles outside of the recall scopes. The agency reserves the right to take further action if warranted by the circumstances.
- OTHEREQ12002CLOSEDOpened 2/14/2012Autoliv Air Bag Propellant MixtureAIR BAGS:SIDE/WINDOW
The summary for this investigation, labeled EQ12-002 Autoliv Closing Resume, can be found attached separately to this resume.This EQ is closed.