Ford F-150 Investigations

59 ODI actions on file.

• EAEA26001RECALLOpened 1/30/2026
  Unintended Transmission Downshift and Rear Wheel Lock-up
  POWER TRAIN:AUTOMATIC TRANSMISSION:CONTROL MODULE (TCM/PCM/TECM)

  On March 21, 2025, NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE25002) to investigate instances of unexpected transmission downshifting without driver input in model year (MY) 2015-2017 Ford F-150 vehicles (subject vehicles) manufactured by Ford Motor Company (Ford). The complaints allege that, without warning or driver input, the subject vehicles experienced a sudden and rapid deceleration often accompanied by temporary rear wheel lockup, seizure, or skidding, resulting in a loss of vehicle control that increases the risk of crash and injury to all motorists, including those not within the subject vehicles. The MY 2015 and MY 2016 F-150 vehicles were equipped with the “6R80” transmission, while the MY 2017 vehicles were equipped with either the “6R80” transmission or the “10R80” transmission. This investigation was limited to MY 2015-2017 Ford F-150 with the “6R80” transmission. ODI identified 329 Vehicle Owners Questionnaires (VOQs) related to this investigation and sixty percent of these consumers were interviewed to confirm the details of their allegations. Consumers reported that their vehicles’ transmission suddenly downshifted to a lower gear, often to 1st or 2nd gear, without driver input or advance warning. Consumers described the downshift events to be regular and repeated occurrences, with some consumers stating that they no longer drive the vehicle due to safety concerns. Forty-three percent of consumers reported experiencing at least one wheel lockup event, during which the rear tires locked, screeched, or skidded during the transmission downshift.  ODI also found that 114 of the 329 consumers reported having their vehicle’s molded lead frame or valve body assembly (which comes with a molded lead frame) replaced, 80 of which were confirmed through consumer submitted repair invoices. In its response to ODI’s Information Request, Ford provided an assessment of potential root cause of failure for the subject vehicles and how this failure is different from the failure associated with MY 2011-2014 Ford F-150 vehicles that was addressed by four safety recalls (16V-248, 19V-075, 19V-433, and 24V-444). Ford has identified that the defect in the recalled vehicle population involved lead frame supplier production issues resulting in signal loss from the Output Shaft Speed (OSS) sensor. Ford has identified that the alleged defect in the subject vehicle population involved degradation of electrical connections within the lead frame due to thermal cycling and vibration over extended time in service resulting in signal loss from the Transmission Range Sensor (TRS). Signal loss from the TRS can result in an unintended shift to neutral, unintended upshift, or unintended downshift which are regulated by a gear “shift map” based on the vehicle’s speed at the time of signal loss. According to Ford’s “shift map”, at speeds between 35-64 mph, the maximum allowable downshift would be to 2nd gear (i.e. a 6th to 2nd gear downshift event) which Ford has designated to represent the worst-case scenario for subject vehicles. Ford has also acknowledged that the worst-case scenario may also involve temporary wheel lockup. However, Ford has stated that the failure mechanism in the MY 2011-2014 F-150 vehicles—previously addressed through recalls—primarily involved OSS sensor signal loss that could result in 6th to 1st gear downshift events. This OSS-related failure mode is distinct from the TRS-related signal loss identified in the subject vehicle population. ODI has identified an additional potential safety defect associated with the alleged defect in the subject vehicles. Preliminary testing performed by NHTSA’s Vehicle Research Test Center (VRTC) showed that when the TRS experiences an intermittent signal loss, one possible outcome is a change in vehicle direction. Specifically, if a vehicle is operating in reverse up an incline when the TRS signal loss occurs, then the vehicle may shift into neutral causing the vehicle to change directions and roll forward. ODI is opening this Engineering Analysis (EA) to, among other things, perform component-level testing and vehicle testing, as well as review additional technical information to better understand the alleged defect that has been identified. To review the reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

• PEPE25002CLOSEDOpened 3/21/2025
  Unintended Transmission Downshift and Rear Wheel Lock-up
  POWER TRAIN:AUTOMATIC TRANSMISSION:CONTROL MODULE (TCM/PCM/TECM)

  On March 21, 2025, NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened this Preliminary Evaluation (PE25002) to investigate instances of unexpected transmission downshifting without driver input in model year (MY) 2015-2017 Ford F-150 vehicles (subject vehicles) manufactured by Ford Motor Company (Ford). The complaints allege that, without warning or driver input, the subject vehicles experienced a sudden and rapid deceleration often accompanied by temporary rear wheel lockup, seizure, or skidding, resulting in a loss of vehicle control that increases the risk of crash and injury to all motorists, including those not within the subject vehicles. The MY 2015 and MY 2016 F-150 vehicles were equipped with the “6R80” transmission, while the MY 2017 vehicles were equipped with either the “6R80” transmission or the “10R80” transmission. This investigation was limited to MY 2015-2017 Ford F-150 with the “6R80” transmission. ODI identified 329 Vehicle Owners Questionnaires (VOQs) related to this investigation and sixty percent of these consumers were interviewed to confirm the details of their allegations. Consumers reported that their vehicles’ transmission suddenly downshifted to a lower gear, often to 1st or 2nd gear, without driver input or advance warning. Consumers described the downshift events to be regular and repeated occurrences, with some consumers stating that they no longer drive the vehicle due to safety concerns. Forty-three percent of consumers reported experiencing at least one wheel lockup event, during which the rear tires locked, screeched, or skidded during the transmission downshift.  ODI also found that 114 of the 329 consumers reported having their vehicle’s molded lead frame or valve body assembly (which comes with a molded lead frame) replaced, 80 of which were confirmed through consumer submitted repair invoices. In its response to ODI’s Information Request, Ford provided an assessment of potential root cause of failure for the subject vehicles and how this failure is different from the failure associated with MY 2011-2014 Ford F-150 vehicles that was addressed by four safety recalls (16V-248, 19V-075, 19V-433, and 24V-444). Ford has identified that the defect in the recalled vehicle population involved lead frame supplier production issues resulting in signal loss from the Output Shaft Speed (OSS) sensor. Ford has identified that the alleged defect in the subject vehicle population involved degradation of electrical connections within the lead frame due to thermal cycling and vibration over extended time in service resulting in signal loss from the Transmission Range Sensor (TRS). Signal loss from the TRS can result in an unintended shift to neutral, unintended upshift, or unintended downshift which are regulated by a gear “shift map” based on the vehicle’s speed at the time of signal loss. According to Ford’s “shift map”, at speeds between 35-64 mph, the maximum allowable downshift would be to 2nd gear (i.e. a 6th to 2nd gear downshift event) which Ford has designated to represent the worst-case scenario for subject vehicles. Ford has also acknowledged that the worst-case scenario may also involve temporary wheel lockup. However, Ford has stated that the failure mechanism in the MY 2011-2014 F-150 vehicles—previously addressed through recalls—primarily involved OSS sensor signal loss that could result in 6th to 1st gear downshift events. This OSS-related failure mode is distinct from the TRS-related signal loss identified in the subject vehicle population. ODI has identified an additional potential safety defect associated with the alleged defect in the subject vehicles. Preliminary testing performed by NHTSA’s Vehicle Research Test Center (VRTC) showed that when the TRS experiences an intermittent signal loss, one possible outcome is a change in vehicle direction. Specifically, if a vehicle is operating in reverse up an incline when the TRS signal loss occurs, then the vehicle may shift into neutral causing the vehicle to change directions and roll forward. Based on NHTSA’s analysis of consumer data, information provided by Ford, and preliminary testing conducted by NHTSA’s VRTC, this Preliminary Evaluation is being upgraded to an Engineering Analysis (EA26001). During this Engineering Analysis, the agency plans to, among other things, perform component-level testing and vehicle testing, as well as review additional technical information to better understand the alleged defect that has been identified from this Preliminary Evaluation. To review the reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

• PEPE24019RECALLOpened 7/29/2024
  Low-pressure fuel pump failure
  FUEL SYSTEM, GASOLINE:DELIVERY:FUEL PUMP

  On July 29, 2024, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened PE24019 to investigate complaints of low-pressure fuel pump failures in MY 2021 Ford Bronco vehicles. Some consumers reported that the failure occurred without warning while driving, resulting in a complete loss of motive power with no ability to restart the engine. Ford determined that several other vehicle models contain low-pressure fuel pumps substantially similar to the 2021 Ford Bronco, including the 2022-2023 Ford Bronco, 2018-2023 Ford F-150, 2022-2023 Ford Expedition, 2019-2023 Lincoln Navigator, 2020-2023 Ford F-250-F-550, 2024 Ford Super Duty Chassis Cab, 2024-2025 Ford Ranger, 2020-2023 Ford Explorer, 2020-2023 Lincoln Aviator, and 2021-2025 Ford Mustang. ODI's investigation found that the affected vehicles may lose fuel pressure and flow from the fuel delivery module (consisting of a low-pressure fuel pump, jet pump, reservoir, and other parts) due to a low-pressure pump failure. This can cause the engine to stall while driving. The root cause is reduced internal clearance in the fuel pump, increasing friction and sensitivity to vapor lock. Fuel blockage from contamination inside the jet pump also contributed to the failure. Ford stated that the contamination source was unknown. On July 7, 2025, Ford filed recall 25V-455 for certain 2021-2023 Ford F-550 SD/F-450 SD/F-350 SD/F-250 SD, 2021-2022 Lincoln Navigator, 2021-2022 Ford Mustang, 2021-2022 Ford F-150, 2021-2023 Ford Explorer, 2022 Ford Expedition, and 2021-2023 Ford Bronco vehicles produced between July 1, 2021, and July 30, 2022. The recall also included certain 2021-2023 Lincoln Aviator produced between July 1, 2021, and December 21, 2022. Ford explained in its recall filingthat the production dates used for the recall were based on changes in the manufacturing process. Specifically, Ford determined that in June 2021, the supplier modified the jet pump manufacturing process, producing fuel pump chambers with a lower-than-specified internal clearance. In July 2022, the supplier implemented corrective actions to the manufacturing process by adding two additional vacuum pumps to reduce contamination during the production of the jet pump. ODI has identified approximately 1,000 reports involving vehicles covered in this investigation but excluded from recall 25V-455. However, even with such reports, these vehicles experienced comparatively lower failure rates than the vehicles that are subject to Recall 25V-455. Ford has explained that these vehicles were excluded from the recall population because they did not experience the manufacturing changes that prompted the recall. Specifically, according to Ford, vehicles built before July 1, 2021 (the recall production start date), were not affected by the supplier’s change to the jet pump manufacturing process. Even after closing this investigation, ODI will continue to monitor complaints for vehicles excluded from recall 25V-455 to consider whether they exhibit the same risks as the vehicles encompassed by the recall. The recall remedy is currently under development. In view of Ford’s recall action, ODI is closing this Preliminary Evaluation, but will continue to monitor the issue as a remedy is developed and implemented. ODI will take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

• RQRQ24005RECALLOpened 3/27/2024
  Unintended Transmission Downshift
  POWER TRAIN:AUTOMATIC TRANSMISSION:CONTROL MODULE (TCM/PCM/TECM)

  In September 2016, Ford Motor Company (Ford) issued safety recall 16V-248 which included certain model year (MY) 2011-2012 Ford F-150 vehicles equipped with 6-speed (6R80) automatic transmissions. This recall was in response to allegations of unintended, unexpected vehicle transmission downshifting to a lower gear without warning, often accompanied by temporary rear wheel lock-up, increasing the risk of a crash and/or injury, and included approximately 153,581 vehicles. Ford identified the root cause of the unintended, unexpected vehicle transmission downshifting to a lower gear to be intermittent signal loss from the transmission’s Output Shaft Speed (OSS) sensor due to solder joint cracks on the OSS circuit board as a result of manufacturing process issues. The OSS sensor is mounted onto the molded lead frame and transmits changes in transmission shaft speed to the Powertrain Control Module (PCM). The remedy program described in safety recall 16V-248 involved reprogramming of the PCM to prevent unintended vehicle transmission downshifting from occurring. In December 2017, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Recall Query (RQ17-010) to assess the scope and remedy effectiveness of safety recall 16V-248. As a result of this ODI investigation, Ford issued safety recall 19V-075 to expand the scope of 16V-248 to include MY 2011-2013 Ford F-150 vehicles equipped with 6-speed (6R80) automatic transmissions and included approximately 1,263,051 vehicles. The remedy program described in safety recall 19V-075 involved reprogramming of the PCM to prevent unintended vehicle transmission downshifting from occurring. In June 2019, Ford issued safety recall 19V-433 as the remedy program used to service MY 2013 Ford F-150 5.0L and 6.2L vehicles in accordance with safety recall 19V-075 did not contain the necessary updates to prevent unintended vehicle transmission downshifting from occurring and included approximately 107,857 vehicles. On March 27, 2024, ODI opened this Recall Query (RQ24-005) to investigate the scope of the above-described safety recalls. At the time that this investigation was opened, ODI had received 86 Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQs) reporting allegations of unintended, unexpected vehicle transmission downshifting to a lower gear without warning, often accompanied by temporary rear wheel lock-up, in MY 2014 Ford F-150 vehicles. As a result of this Recall Query, Ford filled safety recall 24V-444 on June 14, 2024, to include MY 2014 Ford F-150 vehicles and expand the scope of safety recalls 16V-248, 19V-075 and 19V-433. The remedy program described in safety recall 24V-444 involved reprogramming of the PCM to prevent unintended vehicle transmission downshifting from occurring and included approximately 552,188 vehicles. In its May 2024 response to ODI’s information request, Ford concluded that a predominant root cause for the intermittent OSS signal loss has not been identified outside of the original safety recall (16V-248). Ford’s investigation also concluded that the primary causes of the defect in MY 2014 F-150 vehicles were related to the molded lead frame and the control assembly transmission main. In the May 2024 response, Ford identified 2,184 total reports that described unintended vehicle transmission downshifting and rear wheel lock-up events; 1,441 warranty claims and 743 reports from consumer complaints, field reports, consumer surveys, and lawsuits/legal claims. Note that the values presented here and in the table above represent the total number of reports which can include a single consumer with multiple reports of the same event as well as a consumer with reports of multiple distinct events. Of the 1,441 warranty claims, 551 warranty claims involved repair of the molded lead frame (38%) and 509 warranty claims involved repair of the control assembly transmission main (35%). Ford has also stated that the PCM programming used to prevent unintended vehicle transmission downshifting was implemented starting with MY 2015 vehicle #1 production and onward. In view of the safety recall action being taken by Ford, ODI is closing this Recall Query (RQ24-005). The agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

• EAEA23002RECALLOpened 9/29/2023
  Loss of Motive Power
  ENGINE

  On July 22, 2022, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) granted a Defect Petition (DP22001) and opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE22007) to investigate allegations of loss of motive power in model year (MY) 2021 Ford Bronco vehicles equipped with 2.7L EcoBoost engines. Complainants were reporting sudden engine failure while driving resulting in a loss of motive power, often without the ability to restart. During PE22007, the cause of engine failure and loss of motive power in the subject vehicles was determined to be intake valve fracture, and the full scope of vehicles affected by the subject defect was identified as all MY 2021-2022 Ford and Lincoln models equipped with either the 2.7L or 3.0L EcoBoost engines, referred to as the “Nano” engine family.  If an intake valve fractures in the subject engines, it may drop into the cylinder and contact the piston, often resulting in catastrophic engine damage. On September 29, 2023, PE22007 was upgraded to an Engineering Analysis (EA23002) to further investigate the subject defect across the full scope of affected vehicles. During EA23002, ODI visited Ford facilities to review technical information related to intake valve fracture in “Nano” engines, coordinated with NHTSA’s Vehicle Research and Testing Center (VRTC), and analyzed updated field data relating the subject defect. Forensic analysis of fractured intake valves demonstrated that the defective components exhibited “grinding burn” or out of specification hardness in the area of the keeper grooves. The presence of grinding burn is evidence that during the groove grinding phase of production, the temperature of the valve became sufficiently high to alter the microstructure of the material and is indicative that the valve supplier’s manufacturing processes were not within control specifications. Grinding burn results in a hard, brittle microstructure and high residual stresses toward the surface of the valve. Through normal engine loading, a valve with grinding burn will likely fracture at the area of highest vulnerability, which is the third keeper groove. In its response to the EA23002 Information Request (IR) letter, Ford provided evidence of 396 customer complaints (including field reports), 825 warranty claims, and 936 engine exchanges. When considering both ODI and manufacturer failure report data, there have been reports representing 1066 unique vehicles within the subject vehicle population. Analysis of the failure report data demonstrates that vehicles equipped with potentially defective intake valves were built within a production “spike period” of May 2021 – October 2021. The beginning of the spike period corresponds to a ramp up in production at the valve supplier manufacturing facility, and the end of the spike period aligns with the implementation of several mid-production process improvements and the decision to change the metal alloy used to produce intake valves from “Silchrome Lite” to “Silchrome 1”. Ford began investigating the subject defect in July 2021, determined the root cause, and took corrective measures for the new production vehicles. Analysis of the failure report data demonstrates that these corrective actions were successful in eliminating the risk of intake valve fracture for subject vehicles produced after October 2021. However, Ford did not take any field action to address vehicles produced during the spike period, and in the several months following the implementation of the production changes, a significant number of field failures continued to occur. It is Ford’s assessment that not all valves produced during the spike period are defective, and that failures associated with the subject defect occur at low time in service. Analysis of the failure report data demonstrates that the vast majority of failures have occurred before 20,000 miles with over half of all reported failures occurring before 5,000 miles. The rate of reported failures related to the subject defect has steadily decreased since November 2021. ODI coordinated with NHTSA’s National Center for Statistics and Analysis (NCSA) to conduct statistical analysis and predict the number of future failures associated with the subject defect. The results of this analysis, and the trends identified through the failure report data are generally consistent with Ford’s assessment that defective intake valves will likely fail at a low time in service and indicate that the majority of subject vehicles equipped with defective valves have already experienced a failure. On August 23, 2024, Ford submitted recall 24V635 for subject vehicles equipped with “Nano” engines and built within the production spike period identified above (total population 90,736 vehicles). The remedy includes an inspection at a Ford/Lincoln dealership where the lifetime engine cycles of the vehicle will be determined. If a vehicle does not meet a threshold for lifetime engine cycles, the dealership will conduct a high RPM engine cycle accumulation procedure, which aims to identify if the vehicle is equipped with defective intake valves. Any vehicle that fails the accumulation procedure will receive an engine replacement under the recall. In addition to recall 24V635, Ford has stated that it will launch customer satisfaction campaign 24N12, which will provide extended warranty coverage to the subject vehicles through the earlier of 10 years or 150,000 miles. In view of the recall action being taken by Ford, ODI is closing this Engineering Analysis. To review the reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

• PEPE23001RECALLOpened 1/27/2023
  Windshield trim molding Item detachment
  STRUCTURE:BODY:ROOF AND PILLARS

  On January 27, 2023, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened PE23-001 to investigate allegations of A-pillar trim panel detachment on model year (MY) 2011-2019 Ford Explorer vehicles. At the time of opening, the office had received 164 Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQs) reporting this failure. ODI has received 671 VOQs regarding this failure, including 1 alleged crash and 2 alleged injuries. Some consumers have reported that the failure occurred while they were driving at highway speeds, with the detached trim panel entering the path of travel of the vehicle behind them, requiring the driver of the following vehicle to take evasive action. It is noteworthy that motorists who experience this type of road hazard are less likely to accurately identify the subject vehicle the item detached from and report the event to the NHTSA. In its April 17, 2023 response to ODI’s information request, Ford provided 175 consumer complaints (including field reports) and 14,162 warranty claims related to A-pillar trim panel detachment. Ford relayed that the subject vehicles utilize a plastic A-pillar bracket, which is bolted to the vehicle structure during assembly. The A-pillar trim panel is attached to the bracket utilizing 7 plastic clips. Contributory factors which have been identified by Ford as leading to the subject defect include incomplete installation at the assembly plant, inadequate part stack up, damage to fasteners during installation, and failure to follow proper repair procedure during windshield replacements or other services. On January 19, 2024, Ford filed safety recall 24V-031 for MY 2011-2019 Ford Explorer vehicles to address the subject defect. In the Part 573 Safety Recall Report, Ford identified that a detached A-pillar trim panel can create a road hazard for other road users, increasing the risk of a crash. The recall remedy includes an inspection of the existing A-pillar trim panel and, if necessary, the replacement of the component. The remedy A-pillar trim panels will be installed with an additional adhesive for robustness and utilize an inspection procedure to ensure full engagement of all the retention clips during installation. In view of the recall action being taken by Ford, ODI is closing this Preliminary Evaluation. The agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

• RQRQ21002RECALLOpened 8/3/2021
  Rearview Camera FMVSS 111 Noncompliance
  BACK OVER PREVENTION: SENSING SYSTEM: CAMERA

  On September 23, 2020, Ford Motor Company (Ford) filed a noncompliance recall report under 49 CFR Part 573 (NHTSA Recall No. 20V-575), recalling 620,246 Model Year (MY) 2020 Ford F-150, F-250, F-350, F-450, F-550, Explorer, Mustang, Transit, Expedition, Escape, Ranger and Edge, and Lincoln Nautilus and Corsair vehicles for a noncompliance with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 111, Rear Visibility. Ford's recall described the noncompliance as insufficient electrical conductivity within the printed circuit board (PCB) internal to the camera leading to intermittent rearview camera operation. The supplier of the cameras was Magna Electronics.According to Ford's chronology in the Part 573, during the period February-April 2020, Ford identified and monitored warranty claims pertaining to intermittent or inoperative rearview cameras. Ford reviewed supplier product changes, focusing on changes introduced by the supplier in the October-November 2019 time frame. The Part 573 stated that the issue was brought to Ford's Critical Concerns Review Group (CCRG) for review on May 12, 2020.On July 7, 2020, NHTSA's Vehicle Research and Testing Center (VRTC) informed the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) of a trend of MY 2020 Escape vehicles with rearview camera malfunctions. ODI contacted Ford the next day, providing five Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQs) alleging inoperative rearview cameras. On July 15, 2020, Ford met with NHTSA to discuss the rearview camera issue. In a subsequent August 24, 2020 meeting, ODI and NHTSA's Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance (OVSC) met with Ford to discuss the recall status and additional VOQs. Ford presented rate and scope data for many of its MY 2020 products during the August 2020 meeting indicating high failure rates for certain models.This RQ is being opened to investigate both the timeliness and scope of Ford's rearview camera recall (20V-575), and Ford's compliance with reporting requirements.The subject reports referenced in the opening resume are identified by the following ODI reference numbers which can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov: 11349813, 11344126, 11342696, 11341486, 11340254, 11337274, 11331444, 11330875, 11329235, 11316960, 11343521, 11341884, 11337226, 11344018, and 11339573.

• PEPE18008RECALLOpened 8/3/2018
  Seatbelt Pretensioner Fire
  SEAT BELTS:PRETENSIONER

  On June 18, 2018, the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE18-008) to investigate complaints alleging post-crash fires at the B pillar in the area of the seat belt pretensioners on MY 2014-2018 Ford F-150 Regular Cab, and Super Crew Cab Vehicles. On August 24, 2018, Ford Motor Company recalled (FSA 18S27 - NHTSA #18V568) the affected population. Ford's investigation found that some front seat belt pretensioners may generate sparks during deployment in excess of Ford's specification. Sparks in the pretensioner exhaust gases inside the lower portion of the B-pillar may subsequently ignite combustible components contained in the B-pillar, such as insulation or carpet, and may cause a subsequent vehicle fire. ODI also requested relevant information from other manufacturers to assess the potential scope of post-crash pretensioner fires. Ford will notify owners and require dealers to remove B-pillar insulation material and wiring harness tape, and install heat resistant tape, free of charge. The recall notification began September 28, 2018.Owners may contact Ford customer service at 1-866-436-7332.The VOQs associated with the closing of this investigation are: 11143035, 11130056, 11129828, 11128761, 11127993, 11127880, 11124717, 11123419, 11119651, 11119626, 11114065, 11113160, 11111822, 11097937, 11078447, 11014688

• RQRQ17010RECALLOpened 12/25/2017
  Unexpected Transmission Downshift
  POWER TRAIN:AUTOMATIC TRANSMISSION:CONTROL MODULE (TCM/PCM/TECM)

  The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened an investigation based on consumer allegations of transmissions unexpectedly downshifting to a lower gear without input from the driver on model year (MY) 2011-2013 Ford F-150, Expedition and Navigator vehicles. ODI has received 455 unique reports related to the alleged problem that were not covered under a previous recall for this issue (16V-248).Expedition and Navigator complaint rates are lower than F-150 complaints. Of those 455 reports, 34.7% claimed that the rear wheels locked up when the transmission downshifted. There were 4 accident claims with no injuries. There are many instances where drivers report leaving their lane or the road because of this issue.In response to ODI's Information Request (IR) letter, Ford Motor Company (Ford) responded with 783 unique reports related to the alleged problem. There were 6 accident claims with 3 injuries. Ford also submitted 1206 warranty claims related to transmission downshifting failures. The failure can occur at any time, but typically at higher speed, and include symptoms such as sudden transmission downshifting, loss of speedometer, erratic shifting of transmission, and transmission stuck in one gear. The failures typically occur without warning and may result in the rear wheels momentarily locking up. The driver often had to fully stop the vehicle and restart it to get the vehicle to shift properly.On February 2nd, 2019 Ford notified ODI that it would conduct a safety recall (19V-075) to remedy transmission downshifting failures on all 2011-2013 F-150 vehicles. Ford will also offer extended warranties to 2011-2013 Expedition and Navigator vehicles with the same issue. Per Ford, some vehicles may experience an intermittent loss of Transmission Output Speed Sensor (OSS) signal to the Powertrain Control Module (PCM), potentially resulting in a temporary unintended downshift into first gear. Ford will reprogram the PCM with software that will prevent an unintended downshift into first gear and illuminate the Malfunction Indicator Light in the event of an intermittent OSS signal loss.The recall action initiated by the manufacturer appears to address the safety risks of concern to ODI.Accordingly, the investigation is closed.The ODI reports cited above can be reviewed at www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/owners/SearchNHTSAID under the identification (ODI) numbers found in the attached list.

• AQAQ17001CLOSEDOpened 1/4/2017
  Champion Ford Edinboro / Steering Shaft
  STEERING

  NHTSA opened AQ17-001 to determine whether Champion Ford Edinboro, Inc. (Champion Ford), of Edinboro, Pennsylvania, complied with the requirements of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301 (Safety Act) and its implementing regulations. The Safety Act requires, among other things, that a manufacturer notify its dealers of defects related to motor vehicle safety and non-compliances with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards and, in turn, that a dealer not sell a new vehicle subject to a recall unless the recall remedy has been performed (49 U.S.C. ?30120(i)).NHTSA issued an information request (IR) letter to Champion Ford on January 4, 2017.Champion Ford responded to this request on January 19, 2017.Also on January 4, 2017, an IR letter was issued to Ford Motor Company (Ford) and a response was received from Ford on January 25, 2017.Finally, another IR was issued to Champion Ford on May 31, 2017, and Champion Ford's response letter was submitted to NHTSA on June 14, 2017.NHTSA's investigation indicated that Champion Ford did sell and deliver recalled vehicles that did not have the recall remedy completed at the time the vehicles were delivered to the customers.NHTSA therefore concluded that Champion Ford was liable for civil penalties for violations of the Safety Act, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. ?30165.Under a Settlement Agreement dated April 16, 2018, Champion Ford agreed to pay compromised civil penalties in the amount of $20,000.Champion Ford also represented in writing that it repaired all twenty-three (23) recalled vehicles identified in AQ17-001 and will strictly adhere to Ford's procedures requiring dealers to check for outstanding safety recalls prior to customer delivery.NHTSA's Recall Management Division has verified that all twenty-three (23) vehicles have been remedied of the safety recalls identified in AQ17-001.This Audit Query is closed.

• RQRQ16001RECALLOpened 9/28/2016
  Brake Master Cylinder Failure
  SERVICE BRAKES

  On June 8, 2020, Ford Motor Company issued a safety recall (NHTSA Recall No. 20V-332) of 292,311 model year (MY) 2014-2017 Ford F-150 vehicles equipped with 3.5L Ecoboost engines and built from 9/1/2014 to 8/1/2016. Ford stated that the causes of brake fluid loss in the master cylinder are brake fluid contamination that can interfere with rear cup seal function, and rolling of the rearmost cup seal.Prior to total loss of the front brakes, depending on the amount of brake fluid loss in the master cylinder, the driver may receive an audible chime, message center alert and red brake warning indicator in the instrument cluster, and may experience a change in brake pedal travel and increased pedal effort. It should be noted that a small number of late-built MY 2014 and early-built MY 2017 F-150 vehicles are included in the recall along with the subject vehicles (MY 2015-2016).This Recall Query is closed based on the safety recall issued by Ford. The ODI reports cited above can be viewed at NHTSA.gov under the following ID numbers:10734951 10839988 10862418 10872737 10873438 10876359 10881590 10883442 10885352 10888026 10888524 10891826 10891829 10891886 10893632 10894688 10894844 10896122 10896446 10898079 10899093 10899198 10902944 10903776 10904695 10908281 10910101 10913678 10913867 10914016 10914164 10914288 10914361 10914382 10914483 10914507 10915027 10915894 10916302 10916346 10916578 10920258 10925699 10926076 10926148 10926179 10927388 10927402 10927459 10927578 10928457 10928906 10930128 10936207 10940199 10943902 10948941 10950413 10954419 10956798 10969452 10969971 10984389 10985533 10991033 10993430 10993826 10994249 11000331 11000746 11001283 11001291 11001403 11001550 11002014 11002827 11003801 11004795 11005551 11010248 11010341 11011291 11011502 11012944 11013023 11013826 11014954 11015390 11018677 11018771 11020059 11021249 11021632 11022034 11022116 11022243 11023791 11025448 11030416 11030852 11039991 11082190 11082307 11083373 11083998 11089076 11091017 11092142 11093509 11096406 11096501 11097550 11097885 11099405 11099859 11100723 11101189 11101357 11101515 11101631 11102242 11102281 11102299 11102326 11102360 11102481 11104187 11104212 11104877 11109739 11110958 11111028 11111445 11111776 11112143 11112145 11112331 11112445 11112504 11112969 11112970 11114501 11115336 11115612 11118050 11118324 11119688 11119741 11120003 11120625 11120839 11121496 11122946 11123817 11124180 11124313 11124735 11129689 11129763 11129799 11130736 11131008 11132384 11139389 11139955 11154079 11163050 11183075 11189767 11192325 11193564 11195772 11196715 11205224 11205725 11208030 11208558 11209657 11210390 11217868 11218183 11218476 11218533 11218548 11218703 11218773 11219228 11219556 11220778 11221408 11221528 11221888 11222322 11222604 11222909 11228582 11228780 11229191 11229412 11229541 11229673 11230311 11230525 11230553 11230595 11230606 11230664 11231440 11231744 11231985 11232226 11232462 11233423 11233425 11233557 11233595 11233614 11233857 11233864 11234025 11234577 11234715 11234752 11240161 11240184 11240219 11240344 11241143 11241328 11241565 11241737 11241755 11241979 11242032 11242096 11242101 11242222 11242430 11242723 11243775 11244070 11244092 11244223 11244613 11244872 11245199 11245233 11245259 11245846 11246001 11251825 11252130 11252506 11252570 11252595 11252809 11254026 11254116 11254385 11254816 11255210 11255273 11255487 11256470 11257328 11257549 11258458 11258978 11265268 11267540 11269887 11279423 11281670 11287382 11291824 11297512 11298972 11301103 11306644 11310503 11315450 11316153 11318273 11319339 11319344 11319751

• PEPE16003RECALLOpened 2/29/2016
  Master Cylinder External Leak
  SERVICE BRAKES

  On May 23, 2016, Ford Motor Company (Ford) submitted a Defect Information Report (DIR) to NHTSA regarding a master cylinder defect that could result in loss of the front brake circuit in approximately 225,012 model year 2013 through 2014 Ford F-150 vehicles equipped with 3.5-liter GTDI engines and built at the Dearborn Truck Plant from August 1, 2013 through August 22, 2014; and the Kansas City Assembly Plant from August 1, 2013 through August 31, 2014 (NHTSA Recall #16V-345, Ford Recall #16S24).Ford indicated that the rearmost cup seal in the brake master cylinder may roll, resulting in leakage from the brake fluid reservoir to the brake booster.According to Ford's DIR, Depending on the amount of brake fluid loss from the brake master cylinder into the brake booster, the driver will experience an audible chime, message center alert, red brake warning light in the instrument cluster and may begin to experience a change in brake pedal travel and feel.In the event that a loss of brake fluid is substantial enough to reduce brake function to the front wheels, the driver may experience longer pedal travel, increased pedal effort, and extended stopping distance, increasing the risk of a crash.Full braking function would remain in the rear wheel brake circuit.Ford's recall will replace the master cylinder and, if the master cylinder is leaking, also replace the brake booster.Seventy-three (73) of the complaints received by ODI contained vehicle identification number (VIN) information required to determine date of build and recall applicability.ODI's analysis found that 66 complaints to ODI and 278 complaints to Ford involving vehicles built in the range covered by 16V-345, resulting in an overall complaint rate of 152.9 incidents per 100,000 vehicles.Twelve (12) crash incidents were reported, including 11 with VIN information.All 11 crash incidents with VIN information reported involve vehicles covered by Ford's recall.ODI's analysis identified 7 ODI complaints and 36 Ford complaints in the 194,139 subject vehicles built outside of the build range for 16V-345, resulting in a complaint rate of 22.1 incidents per 100,000 vehicles.Ford indicated that warranty return analyses identified issues with minor internal leakage between circuits due to internal contamination caused by supplier assembly plant cleanliness concerns in these vehicles.Ford assessed the internal leak condition as an early-life condition with minimal safety risk that does not result in loss of fluid or circuit failure.ODI will continue to monitor complaints in subject vehicles not included in 16V-345.No complaints have been identified in MY 2013 through 2014 Ford F-150 vehicles equipped with other engine options.The recall action initiated by the manufacturer appears to address the safety risks identified by this investigation.This preliminary evaluation is closed.The ODI reports cited above can be reviewed at http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/owners/SearchSafetylssues under the following identification numbers:10870768, 10870747, 10870511, 10870395, 10870055, 10869981, 10865843, 10865521, 10865342, 10865043, 10864862, 10864714, 10864360, 10863982, 10863527, 10862333, 10862047, 10861735, 10861190, 10860378, 10860118, 10855381, 10855356, 10854785, 10853751, 10853295, 10853012, 10852349, 10852134, 10852037, 10851317, 10851268, 10851109, 10850015, 10849862, 10846488, 10846335, 10846193, 10846006, 10840414, 10840377, 10839994, 10839985, 10839981, 10839833, 10839825, 10839816, 10838782, 10838510, 10818273, 10817706, 10809601, 10788886, 10788369, 10785526, 10779854, 10776834, 10766291, 10762034, 10761412, 10760663, 10758997, 10750065, 10749886, 107

• EAEA15006CLOSEDOpened 10/16/2015
  Brake Vacuum Pump Failure
  SERVICE BRAKES, ELECTRIC

  On February 15, 2016, Ford Motor Company initiated Customer Satisfaction Program 15N05 to extend warranty coverage for the electric vacuum pump in certain model year (MY) 2011 through 2012 Ford F-150 pickup trucks equipped with 3.5L GTDI engines.The program extends coverage for up to 10 years of service or 150,000 miles from the warranty start date of the vehicle, all vehicles are eligible for the program through July 30, 2016 regardless of mileage.Ford's program covers all repairs related to electric vacuum pump (EVP) malfunctions including excessive noise, vibration, or change in brake pedal feel while applying the brakes at cold start. Ford states that the engine intake manifold is the primary source of vacuum for the brake booster and is fully compliant to motor vehicle safety standards without the supplemental vacuum supplied by the EVP.The company also contends that failure modes related to the EVP are progressive and provide warning to operators by way of noise and vibration before an operator to experience any temporary change in brake pedal feel.ODI's analysis of warranty data found that the majority of claims involved consumer concerns with EVP noise or vibration from the left front fender area when the vehicle is first started. Continued operation in this mode with pump motor noise will eventually result in the EVP seizing or becoming non-functional.Component failure analysis indicated that Ford and its supplier, Continental, identified a pump crank drive corrosion condition due to moisture entry through the vacuum intake.Corrosion damage to EVP internal components may eventually result in a blown fuse in the power distribution box and total loss of EVP function.Analysis of consumer complaints, field reports, and warranty data related to EVP failures found thatincidents predominantly occurred in driveways and parking lots in the periods immediately after cold engine starts.Many consumers operated their vehicle for some period of time with a blown EVP fuse without realizing that the pump had failed or that the vehicle had a brake system malfunction.Consumers who did experience braking performance issues reporteda temporary hard brake pedal condition at start-up followed by more consistent normal pedal feel after few seconds.On June 22, 2015, Ford developed a remedy procedure and issued TSB 15-0105 instructing dealers to replace the vacuum pump and install a new vacuum pump harness kit. In addition to reviewing test data submitted by Ford, ODI assessed safety risks associated with the alleged defect under various operating conditions, including: 1) baseline system performance with full engine and EVP vacuum available using exemplar parts, 2) disabled EVP and booster vacuum regulated to simulate worst case conditions for engine intake manifold vacuum supply to the brake booster (approximately 300 mbar); and 3) all source vacuum to the brake booster removed and Optimized Hydraulic Braking (OHB) mode active to represent complete loss of brake booster function (note: this condition is a more severe brake boost system failure mode than the alleged defect).ODI also analyzed all complaints and warranty claims to identify incidents alleging brake system performance concerns related to EVP failures.These analyses identified no brake performance issues or resulting changes in stopping distances either on highway or city traffic conditions.Two complaints alleging EVP malfunctions caused or contributed to rear-end collisions during attempted decelerations from road speeds are not believed to be related to the alleged defect.The EVP provides supplemental vacuum during initial start-up and idle

• PEPE15026CLOSEDOpened 6/22/2015
  Brake Vacuum Pump Failure
  SERVICE BRAKES, ELECTRIC

  On June 22, 2015, the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation PE15-026 to investigate incidents of increased brake pedal effort at cold start and extended stopping distance while driving in traffic, resulting from failures of the electric brake vacuum assist pump in model year (MY) 2011-2012 Ford F-150 pickup trucks equipped with 3.5L GTDI engines. In response to ODI's Information Request (IR) for PE15-026, Ford provided ODI with 396 complaints and field reports relating to incidents of increased brake pedal effort or malfunctions in the electric vacuum pump (EVP). ODI's analysis of the data provided by Ford identified 7 crashes and 1,851 warranty claims related to either a hard brake pedal condition or reduced brake effectiveness. Additionally, ODI identified one report in its database alleging an injury to an occupant of a vehicle struck in the rear by a subject F-150 vehicle with a failed EVP as documented in the police accident report referencing a dealer assessment of the pump.According to Ford, the subject vehicles utilize a traditional brake vacuum booster to provide power assist for braking and the EVP is intended to operate to maintain consistent brake pedal feel. The engine intake manifold is the primary source of vacuum for the booster and is fully compliant to motor vehicle safety standards without the EVP. Ford described the conditions related to a change in brake pedal feel as limited and temporary and provided component failure analysis showing evidence of water entry into the EVP which caused internal pump corrosion. Ford indicated that the EVP failure mode is progressive and provides warning to operators by way of noise and vibration before an operator is likely to experience any temporary change in brake pedal feel. Damage to the EVP motor bearing may eventually result in a blown EVP fuse and total loss of EVP function. Ford provided test data showing the brake pedal forces and pedal travel curves over time for 0.3g decelerations to a stop from 80kph (50mph) for: 1) normal system (full engine and EVP vacuum available); 2) Ford's approximation of worst case booster performance with EVP failure (EVP disabled and booster vacuum regulated to 300mbar to simulate cold start, all accessory loads on, and starting at 0 vacuum); and 3) with all source vacuum to the brake booster removed and Hydraulic Boost Compensation (HBC) active to represent complete loss of brake booster function. The Ford tests showed that the brake pedal forces required for achieving the 0.3g decelerations were relatively low for the normal condition, 35-40 N (8-9 lbf), increased by approximately 2-3 times normal when the EVP is disabled, 75-115 N (17-26 lbf), and increased by about 5-6 times normal for the complete brake booster failure condition, 205-215 N (46-48 lbf). This Preliminary Evaluation has been upgraded to Engineering Analysis (EA15-006) to test for EVP malfunctions under other vehicle operating conditions (e.g., low-speed driveway braking after cold-start with failed EVP), potential human factors contributions and to further assess the scope, frequency, and safety-related consequences of the alleged defect.The VOQs associated with the opening of this investigation are:10565994, 10575987, 10598351, 10604687, 10605701, 10607811, 10610491, 10615536, 10617828, 10619545, 10643075, 10650578, 10662151, 10664415, 10666988, 10668069, 10678844, 10695537, 10700874, 10706217, 10706271, 10712465, 10723033, 10723792, 10726960, 10730549, 10730721, 10730735, 10730837, 10730909, 10731008, 10731135, 10731157, 10731165, 10731395, 10731758, 10732609, 10732878, 10733375, 10733804, 10734558, 10734613, 10743859, 10744214, 10

• PEPE13018CLOSEDOpened 5/22/2013
  Reduced power during hard acceleration
  ENGINE AND ENGINE COOLING

  On May 22, 2013, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened PE13-018 to investigate 95 complaints alleging incidents of reduced engine power during hard accelerations in model year (MY) 2011 through 2013 Ford F-150 trucks.ODI was aware of three technical service bulletins (TSBs) issued by Ford for a condition that was related to moisture accumulation in the Charge Air Cooler (CAC) for the turbochargers.A Preliminary Evaluation was opened to gather information to assess whether the subject vehicles contain a safety related defect.The subject vehicles are powered by Ford?s 3.5L EcoBoost engine which uses twin turbochargers to obtain a balance of fuel economy and engine power based on the driver?s demand.When the driver requests more power from the engine, as in accelerating to pass, merge, ascend hills or haul a load the two turbochargers will spin up compressing the air which is then used to increase the power created by the combustion in the engine.The compressed air, which gains heat by the compression process, is passed through a Charge Air Cooler (CAC) which is designed to lower the temperature of the air in order to make the combustion process even more efficient (Figures 1 and 2).In response to ODI?s Information Request letter, Ford indicated that a misfire condition could occur after steady-speed operation under significantly humid and rainy conditions.Ford?s analysis found that under those conditions, condensation could form and accumulate on the inside of the CAC tubes which could then be ingested into the engine during particularly hard acceleration near wide-open throttle.An engine misfire of up to three cylinders could occur if the amount of condensed water released from the CAC exceeded the engine?s operating threshold for water ingestion.Ford noted that due to regulations set by the EPA, the powertrain software would disable up to two of the misfiring cylinders for no more than 30 seconds and until the driver tips out the throttle in order to protect the catalytic converter from damage. Ford?s testing of this condition on the subject vehicles showed that a vehicle experiencing such a condition would continue to maintain its speed as well as accelerate, albeit at a lower rate than expected by the driver.Similar results were obtained in testing done by NHTSA?s Vehicle Research and Testing Center in East Liberty, Ohio (Figure 6).In an ongoing process to address the problem Ford issued a series of TSBs where a deflector shield was installed onto the CAC (Figures 3, 4 and 5).In January 2014 Ford indicated that its data shows that the TSBs have been effective in resolving the problem, that for the MY 2013 vehicles their remedy is 100% effective and the latest TSBs for MY 2011 ? 2012 are 95% effective.The 525 complaints to ODI and the total 4,120 unique VIN complaints listed in the Failure Report are incidents of alleged reduced power or driveability symptoms and not all are necessarily related to the condition created by water ingestion.Reduced power conditions can occur for a variety of reasons including faults with ignition coils, spark plugs, a catalytic converter, the throttle body, turbocharger, fuel pump/filter, powertrain control module (hardware or software) or transmission shifting problems.Ford also noted that in a large number of warranty claims on the subject vehicles, the CAC was replaced or a TSB procedure was performed when the symptoms exhibited were inconsistent with a CAC water ingestion related issue.Given these circumstances, further use of the agency resources in this matter does not appear to be warranted.Accordingly, this investigation is closed.The closing of

• EAEA11006RECALLOpened 5/4/2011
  Fuel Tank Strap Failure Due to Corrosion
  FUEL SYSTEM, GASOLINE:STORAGE:TANK ASSEMBLY

  One or both of the steel straps holding up the fuel tank and attaching it to the truck frame can corrode and fail (break or separate).If one strap fails, the tank may tilt and drop and possibly contact the road surface.If both straps break, the entire tank may drop to the road.If either failure occurs while the vehicle is being driven, contact with the road can abrade the tank and create a hole from which gasoline can spill.When the tank drops, it remains attached to the vehicle only by the fuel filler hose and/or supply lines, or in rare instances, by the skid plate, if present.In some cases the weight of the tank sufficiently strained the hoses and fittings and caused separation and subsequent fuel leaks from those connections.The fire hazard created by leaking gasoline is increased by the possible presence of sparks created by the metal tank being dragged along the road.Corrosion of the straps appears to be caused by prolonged exposure to road deicers, frequently road salt, used to treat snow or ice covered roads.States in which large quantities of deicers are applied to roads during the winter season (salt belt states) account for the predominant portion of strap failures.Vehicles in these salt belt states are prone to experience corrosion related failures more frequently and earlier in a vehicle?s life cycle.Ford reports approximately 97 percent of reports it received relating to strap failure involve vehicles that were operated in these high corrosion areas, and 95 percent of the reports to NHTSA involved such vehicles.Approximately one-third of F-150 U.S. production was sold in salt belt states.ODI has included in the above counts reports it has received from consumers and reports it has received from Ford in which either the complaint involved confirmed strap corrosion or ODI's assessment of available information suggests corrosion caused the reported problem.Among the incidents reported to NHTSA, 441 involved one or both straps failing due to corrosion, 353 involved the fuel tank dropping and/or dragging on the ground, and 180 involved fuel leakage.ODI has received four reports of strap failure in which the leaking fuel ignited but self-extinguished, and one incident in which fire destroyed the vehicle and injured its driver.Ford reported the same injury incident and three other unique fire incidents, including two in which the leaking fuel ignited and fire destroyed the vehicle.There were no injuries associated with the three unique Ford incidents.Ford has agreed to conduct a recall to repair the subject vehicles.The recall will cover vehicles that were originally sold or are currently registered in salt belt states (regardless of vehicle age).The vehiclesincluded in the recall are those subject vehicles that are, or have ever been, registered in Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, or the District of Columbia.Ford's recall action appears to adequately address the problem at this time.The above vehicle population (1,340,349) includes subject vehicles originally delivered or sold in salt belt states.ODI does not know the current or historical locations of all subject vehicles.According to Ford approximately 73% of the recall population is currently registered (a 27% attrition rate).Ford is also recalling certain MY 1997-1999 F-250 vehicles (under 8,500 GVWR), and MY2002-2003 Lincoln Blackwood vehicles for the same condition, resulting in an estimated 1.1 million total vehicles

• PEPE10036CLOSEDOpened 9/7/2010
  Fuel Tank Strap Corrosion/Rust
  FUEL SYSTEM, GASOLINE:STORAGE:TANK ASSEMBLY

  One or both of the steel straps holding up the fuel tank and attaching it to the truck frame can corrode and break.If one strap breaks, the tank may tilt and drop and possibly contact the road surface.If both straps break, the entire tank may drop to the road.If either failure occurs while the vehicle is being driven, contact with the road can abrade the tank and create a hole from which gasoline can spill.When the tank drops, it remains attached to the vehicle only by the fuel filler hose and/or supply lines, or in rare instances, by the skid plate, if present.This raises the possibility that the weight of the dropped tank could sufficiently strain the hoses and fittings to cause separation and fuel leaks between those components.The fire hazard created by the leaking gasoline is increased by the possible presence of sparks created by the metal tank being dragged along the road.The sparks could ignite the escaped fuel.ODI has included in its incident counts reports it has received from consumers and reports provided by Ford in which either the complaint involved confirmed strap corrosion or ODI's investigation yielded information that strongly suggests the subject defect as the cause of the reported problem.Among the incidents reported to NHTSA or Ford, 243 involved the fuel tank dropping below the vehicle and/or dragging on the ground, 95 involved fuel leakage, and nine included reports of sparks from the tank being dragged on the road.ODI has received one report of strap failure in which the leaking fuel ignited but self-extinguished.Ford reported another incident in which the leaking fuel ignited and the resultant fire destroyed the vehicle.There have been no injuries associated with these incidents.ODI has received reports of corrosion induced tank strap failures with other model year F-150 vehicles.ODI is upgrading this investigation to further investigate the frequency, severity and scope of this problem.

• EAEA10001RECALLOpened 1/13/2010
  Inadvertent airbag deployment
  AIR BAGS

  ODI opened this investigation based on reports of inadvertent airbag deployment.Data provided by Ford indicated that the airbag clockspring jumper wire, which is situated inside the steering wheel assembly, was installed in a manner that would allow it to rub (abrade) against a sharp metal edge on the nearby horn plate.Because the horn plate is electrically grounded the abrasion of an airbag wire on the sharp edge could cause a short circuit condition.As a result the airbag light may illuminate and/or the airbag may inadvertently deploy.Inadvertent deployments are most likely to occur during the airbag system's self-diagnostic test that initiates when the ignition switch is turned on.Ford modified the vehicle design in late January 2006 adding a protective tape over the sharp metal edge of the horn plate.Ford made additional design changes on MY 2007 vehicles to the horn plate, the clockspring jumper, and the connector layouts to further address this issue.ODI identified 318 deployment incidents with 121 alleged injury reports from subject vehicles.All but one of the incident and injury reports occurred in vehicles built before the January 2006 modification.In addition, there was one incident and alleged injury reported in the MY 2006 Mark LT vehicles that share the same design. In letters dated February 21 and April 11, 2011, Ford announced a recall of all of the approximately 1.3 million MY 2004-2006 F-150 vehicles built prior to January 24, 2006, the date the initial vehicle modification was made.In addition, approximately 14,000 MY 2006 Mark LT vehicles built prior to January 24, 2006 will also be recalled.Vehicles built after that date, which contain the modification, are not within the recall scope.Accordingly the investigation is closed.

• PEPE09046RECALLOpened 9/24/2009
  INADVERTENT AIRBAG DEPLOYMENT
  AIR BAGS

  FORD REPORTS THAT THE INADVERTENT AIRBAG DEPLOYMENTS ARE MOST LIKELY CAUSED BY THE AIRBAG HORN MOUNTING PLATE'S SHARP METAL EDGE THAT EVENTUALLY CAN CHAFE/CUT THE AIRBAG CLOCKSPRING JUMPER WIRE LEADING TO A SHORT-TO-GROUND CONDITION.ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY TWO (182) OF THE 230 REPORTS WERE FOR AIRBAG DEPLOYMENTS RESULTING IN 56 INJURIES WITH REMAINING 48 REPORTS FOR AN AIRBAG LIGHT ILLUMINATION CONDITION.INJURIES INCLUDE ABRASION, CONTUSION AND CUTS TO THE ARM/HAND/FACE AND/OR UPPER BODY REGIONS.ONE OWNER REPORTED A BROKEN TOOTH AND TWO OWNERS REPORTED BEING KNOCKED UNCONSCIOUS AS A RESULT OF THE AIRBAG DEPLOYMENT.IN ADDITION, MY2004 AND MY2006 F-150 VEHICLES ALSO CONTAIN THE SAME DESIGN THAT RESULTED IN AN ADDITIONAL 89 REPORTS WITH 37 AIRBAG DEPLOYMENTS AND NINE INJURIES. FORD MADE AN INTERIM DESIGN CHANGE TO THE HORN MOUNTING PLATE IN JANUARY 2006 AND THEN MAJOR CHANGES TO THE HORN MOUNTING PLATE, AIRBAG MODULE AND CLOCKSPRING JUMPER WIRE DESIGNS IN JUNE 2006 FOR THE MY2007 VEHICLES.THIS PRELIMINARY EVALUATION IS UPGRADED TO AN ENGINEERING ANALYSIS (EA10-001) TO INCLUDE MY2004-2006 F-150 VEHICLES AND TO FURTHER EVALUATE THE CONDITION.

• PEPE08063CLOSEDOpened 10/31/2008
  CNG REGULATOR LEAK
  FUEL SYSTEM, OTHER:DELIVERY

  THE AGENCY HAS CLOSED THIS INVESTIGATION BASED ON ITS REVIEW OF COMPLAINT REPORTS, DISCUSSIONS WITH COMPLAINANTS AND FIELD AND TECHNICAL DATA PROVIDED BY FORD.THE SUBJECT VEHICLES ARE 1/2 TON PICKUP TRUCKS AND ARE NATURAL GAS VEHICLES (NGV) THAT ARE FUELED BY GASOLINE OR COMPRESSED NATURAL GAS.THE AGENCY HAS RECEIVED REPORTS ALLEGING IMPROPER OPERATION OF THE NATURAL GAS FUEL PRESSURE REGULATOR ALLOWING RELEASE OF EXCESS AMOUNTS OF NATURAL GAS INTO THE ENGINE COMPARTMENT.FORD REPORTS THAT THE REGULATOR CONTAINS AN OVER PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE THAT WILL VENT NATURAL GAS SHOULD THE PRESSURE EXCEED A SET THRESHOLD.THE COMPLAINT REPORTS AND DATA REVIEWED BY THE AGENCY INDICATE THAT AN IMPROPERLY OPERATING PRESSURE REGULATOR CAN RESULT IN AN OVERPRESSURE CONDITION AND ACTIVATE THE REGULATOR PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE.THE RELEASED NATURAL GAS IS DIRECTED THROUGH A VENT HOSE THAT DISCHARGES THE NATURAL GAS IN THE VICINITY OF THE RIGHT FRONT WHEEL HOUSE AND AWAY FROM THE ENGINE COMPARTMENT'S EXTREMELY HOT AREAS/SURFACES.OWNERS ARE NORMALLY AWARE OF THIS PROBLEM BY THE PRESENCE OF AN ILLUMINATED WARNING LIGHT INSIDE THE VEHICLE, ODOR OF NATURAL GAS OR THE SOUND OF VENTING GAS.WHEN THE OPERATOR TURNS THE ENGINE OFF, THE NATURAL GAS SUPPLY TANK SOLENOID WILL CLOSE AND THE REGULATOR WILL NOT RELEASE NATURAL GAS.AT VEHICLE RESTART, THE SOLENOID VALVE WILL REMAIN CLOSED TO PREVENT LEAKAGE AND THE VEHICLE WILL ONLY OPERATE IN THE GASOLINE MODE.A SAFETY-RELATED DEFECT HAS NOT BEEN IDENTIFIED AT THIS TIME AND FURTHER USE OF AGENCY RESOURCES DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE WARRANTED.ACCORDINGLY, THIS INVESTIGATION IS CLOSED.THE CLOSING OF THIS INVESTIGATION DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A FINDING BY NHTSA THAT A SAFETY-RELATED DEFECT DOES NOT EXIST.THE AGENCY WILL MONITOR THIS ISSUE AND RESERVES THE RIGHT TO TAKE FURTHER ACTION IF WARRANTED BY THE CIRCUMSTANCES.